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LET’S TRY THIS AGAIN: THE ADA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008 
ATTEMPTS TO REINVIGORATE THE “REGARDED AS” PRONG  
OF THE STATUTORY DEFINITION OF DISABILITY 
 
Stephen F. Befort* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)1 was enacted in 1990 with 
considerable fanfare and support. A broad-based coalition of supporters testified in 
favor of the legislation before committee hearings,2 and both houses of Congress 
passed the legislation by wide margins.3 President George Bush, signing the ADA 
into law, described the new statute as “an historic opportunity” representing “the 
full flowering of our democratic principles.”4 Disability rights activists were 
optimistic5 that the new legislation would accomplish its stated purpose of 
providing a “national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities.”6 
An important component of the ADA’s antidiscrimination formula is its 
definition of disability. The ADA furthers the elimination of disability 
discrimination by extending coverage not only to those individuals who currently 
have an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity,7 but also to those 
individuals who are “regarded as having such an impairment.”8 By this extension, 
Congress affirmatively sought to curb “society’s accumulated myths and fears 
about disability.”9 
Reality, however, fell short of expectations. In several decisions beginning in 
1999, the Supreme Court significantly narrowed the class of protected “disabled” 
                                                 
* © 2010 Stephen F. Befort, Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty, & Bennett Professor of Law, 
University of Minnesota Law School. The author thanks Sara Estrin and Randall Ryder for 
their assistance in the preparation of this Article. 
1 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213). 
2 See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. II, at 25–28 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
267, 306–10. 
3 The House of Representatives passed the ADA with a vote of 403–20. See             
136 CONG. REC. 11,466–67 (1990). The Senate voted to approve the ADA with a margin of 
76-8. See 135 CONG. REC. 19,903 (1989). 
4 Presidential Statement on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,        
2 PUB. PAPERS 1070, 1070 (July 26, 1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 601, 602. 
5 See generally Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights 
Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 19 (2000) (noting that the ADA was “enacted 
amid hopes that it would have a sweeping impact”). 
6 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2006). 
7 Id. § 12102(2)(A). 
8 Id. § 12102(2)(C). 
9 Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987). 
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employees. The most significant of these decisions was Sutton v. United Air Lines, 
Inc.10 in which the Court ruled that mitigating measures, such as medication and 
prosthetic devices, should be taken into account in determining whether a person is 
disabled for purposes of the ADA.11 The Court also ruled that a plaintiff is not 
protected by virtue of being regarded as disabled unless the employer perceives the 
plaintiff’s impairment as one that would substantially limit a major life activity.12 
These excessively narrow rulings significantly raised the bar for ADA plaintiffs 
and posed a serious obstacle to eliminating disability discrimination. 
Following extensive negotiations between representatives of the disability and 
business communities,13 Congress enacted the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 
(ADAAA).14 The ADAAA explicitly overrules four Supreme Court decisions that 
had narrowly interpreted the ADA’s definition of disability,15 and emphasizes that 
the definition should be broadly construed.16 Although the ADA’s basic definition 
of disability remains intact, the ADAAA clarifies in several ways that the statutory 
definition should be interpreted in a more encompassing fashion.17 
An individual may be covered by the ADA under any of the three prongs that 
comprise the statutory definition of an individual with a disability: prong one, 
which encompasses individuals who currently have an impairment that 
substantially limits a major life function; prong two, which encompasses 
individuals who have a record of such an impairment; or prong three, which 
encompasses individuals who are regarded as having such an impairment.18 One of 
the most significant changes made by the ADAAA is to the third, or “regarded as,” 
prong of the definition of disability. In a sweeping overruling of the Sutton 
decision, the ADAAA protects an individual from adverse action taken by an 
employer “because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment 
whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life 
activity.”19 As a compromise, however, Congress inserted two important statutory 
limitations. The first limitation is that the “regarded as” prong does “not apply to 
impairments that are transitory and minor.”20 The second limitation is that an 
                                                 
10 527 U.S. 471 (1999). 
11 Id. at 482. 
12 Id. at 489. 
13 See Chai R. Feldblum, Kevin Barry & Emily A. Benfer, The ADA Amendments Act 
of 2008, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 187, 228–40 (2008) (describing the negotiations and 
procedural steps culminating in the enactment of the ADAAA). 
14 ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 
(to be codified in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.). 
15 Id. sec. 2(b)(2)–(5) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 note). 
16 Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(4)(A) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A)). 
17 See infra Part V. 
18 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006). 
19 ADAAA, sec. 4(a), § 3(3)(A) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A)). 
20 Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(3)(B) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B)). 
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employer need not provide a reasonable accommodation “to an individual who 
meets the definition of disability . . . solely under [the ‘regarded as’ prong].”21 
This Article focuses on the likely consequences of the “regarded as” 
compromise embodied in the ADAAA. One positive consequence is clear: the 
ADAAA’s elimination of any functional limitation requirement with respect to the 
“regarded as” prong—that is, the elimination of any need to show that an 
impairment, as perceived, substantially limits a major life activity—will greatly 
expand the class of those with standing to assert a claim of disability 
discrimination. On the other hand, the two accompanying limitations raise several 
areas of uncertainty that will warrant close scrutiny. In particular, these two 
limitations may provide a loophole by which the judiciary again may subvert the 
intended reach of the ADA. 
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part II discusses the origins and intended 
scope of the ADA’s initial definition of disability with particular reference to the 
reach of the “regarded as” prong. Part III then examines the judicial backlash that 
resulted in the severe narrowing of the class of employees with a qualifying 
disability under the ADA. Part IV describes the scholarly and legislative efforts to 
override the limiting Supreme Court decisions. Part V summarizes the ADAAA 
override generally and the “regarded as” provisions more specifically. Finally, part 
VI takes a forward look at the likely impact and lingering concerns implicated by 
the “regarded as” compromise. 
 
II.  THE ADA’S DEFINITION OF DISABILITY 
 
The antidiscrimination formula adopted by Congress in the ADA is more 
complicated than that employed by either Title VII or the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA). Both of these older federal statutes use a relatively 
simple formula for banning discrimination. Title VII, for example, makes it 
unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.22 Although matters of 
proof may be complicated under these two statutes, the legal principle is clear and 
straightforward: discrimination because of a listed trait is unlawful. 
The ADA’s ban on disability-based discrimination is considerably more 
complicated. Paraphrasing three different portions of the statute, the ADA’s 
original antidiscrimination formula can be stated as follows: 
 
No employer shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a 
disability because of the disability of such individual when the 
individual, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the 
                                                 
21 Id. sec. 6(a)(1), §501(h) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12201(h)). 
22 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (emphasis added). The ADEA uses similar language 
in banning discrimination because of age. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006) (“It shall be 
unlawful for an employer . . . to . . . discriminate against any individual . . . because of such 
individual’s age.”). 
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essential functions of the employment position, unless the 
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the 
business of that employer. 23 
 
Accordingly, the ADA’s antidiscrimination formula is more complicated in two 
significant respects. First, only individuals who have a qualifying disability have 
standing to assert a claim under the ADA.24 Second, in ascertaining whether an 
employer is discriminating in violation of the ADA, the statute asks whether the 
employee is qualified for the job “with or without reasonable accommodation,”25 
unless such accommodation would impose an “undue hardship.”26 The more 
complicated ADA formula has engendered uncertainty and a greater degree of 
judicial interpretation,27 including six Supreme Court decisions construing the 
ADA’s definition of disability.28 
In defining a covered disability, the ADA borrowed the Rehabilitation Act’s 
three-prong definition of a “handicapped individual.”29 Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act, as originally enacted in 1973, prohibited discrimination against 
an “otherwise qualified handicapped individual” in federally funded activities and 
programs.30 A “handicapped individual” was defined as someone who “has a 
                                                 
23 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12111(8), 12112(b)(5)(A). 
24 See id. § 12112(a). 
25 Id. Neither Title VII nor the ADEA generally impose any affirmative obligation on 
employers to assist employees in satisfactorily performing the essential functions of their 
jobs. These statutes, instead, merely invoke a negative prohibition against discrimination. 
See Diller, supra note 5, at 40–44 (contrasting how the ADA employs a different-treatment 
model of discrimination with how most antidiscrimination statutes employ an equal-
treatment model of discrimination). While Title VII does impose a duty on an employer to 
accommodate the religious observances and practices of its employees, see 42 U.S.C.          
§ 2000e(j), the Supreme Court has construed this duty as far more limited than that 
imposed by the ADA, see TWA, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (ruling that an 
employer need not incur more than a de minimis hardship in providing an accommodation 
for religious purposes). 
26 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). The term “undue hardship” is defined in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12111(10)(A) as “an action requiring significant difficulty or expense.” 
27 See Stephen F. Befort, The Story of Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.: Narrowing the 
Reach of the Americans with Disabilities Act, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES 
329, 332–35 (Joel Wm. Friedman ed., 2006). 
28 See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 193–96 (2002); 
Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 536–37 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel 
Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 520–25 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 
478–88 (1999); Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 801–05 (1999); 
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 630–42 (1998). 
29 See 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1988) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006)); 
see also Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631 (explaining that “[t]he ADA’s definition of disability is 
drawn almost verbatim” from the Rehabilitation Act). 
30 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified 
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006)). 
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physical or mental disability which for such individual constitutes or results in a 
substantial handicap to employment.”31 One year later, Congress expanded the 
definition of a “handicapped individual” to include any person who “(A) has a 
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such 
person’s major life activities, (B) has a record of such an impairment, or (C) is 
regarded as having such an impairment.”32 Accordingly, the 1974 amendment 
extended protection beyond those individuals with actual disabilities to also 
encompass individuals who are perceived, either correctly or incorrectly, as being 
disabled.33 This revision demonstrated Congress’s concern with protecting the 
handicapped against discrimination stemming not only from simple prejudice, but 
also from “archaic attitudes and laws.”34 
The federal courts generally adopted a broad reading of the disability 
definition under the Rehabilitation Act. Professor Chai Feldblum, in reviewing 
pre-ADA era decisions, summarized her findings as follows: 
 
Courts deciding cases under [the Rehabilitation Act’s] definition had 
decided that individuals with a wide range of serious medical conditions 
could invoke the protections of the law. Indeed, courts had rarely even 
parsed the language of the definition to decide whether a plaintiff was a 
“handicapped individual” under the law. Rather, the definition was 
understood to include any medical condition that was non-trivial, and the 
courts had applied the law’s coverage in that manner.35 
 
The Supreme Court appeared to concur in this assessment. In School Board of 
Nassau County v. Arline, the Supreme Court described the act’s definition as 
“broad” and explained that by extending the definition to include those regarded as 
handicapped, “Congress acknowledged that society’s accumulated myths and fears 
about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that 
flow from actual impairment.”36 Professor Feldblum interpreted this language as 
meaning that the “regarded as” prong was sufficiently broad to cover “any 
individual who had been discriminated against because of any impairment.”37 
When Congress debated the proposed Americans with Disabilities Act in 
1989 and 1990, legislative committee reports explained that the definition of 
disability borrowed from the Rehabilitation Act was meant to incorporate the 
                                                 
31 Id. 
32 Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516, § 111, 88 Stat. 1617, 
1619 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006)). 
33 S. REP. NO. 93-1297, at 37–39, 63–64 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6373, 6388–6390, 6413–6414. 
34 Id. at 50. 
35 Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability under Federal Anti-discrimination Law: 
What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB L. 
91, 91–92 (2000). 
36 Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987). 
37 Feldblum, supra note 35, at 94. 
998 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 4 
prevailing judicial and regulatory interpretation given the latter provision.38 The 
“interpretative guidance” adopted by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) following the enactment of the ADA explicitly made this 
link as well, finding “that the relevant caselaw developed under the Rehabilitation 
Act [is] generally applicable to the term ‘disability’ as used in the ADA.”39 With 
specific reference to the “regarded as” prong of the proposed ADA definition, a 
House Report stated: 
 
In the employment context, if a person is disqualified on the basis of an 
actual or perceived physical or mental condition, and the employer can 
articulate no legitimate job-related reason for the rejection, a perceived 
concern about employing persons with disabilities would be inferred and 
the plaintiff could qualify for coverage under the “regarded as” test.40 
 
Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990 using essentially the 
same definition as in the Rehabilitation Act except with the term “disability” 
substituted for the term “handicapped.”41 Under the ADA, “the term ‘disability’ 
means, with respect to an individual—(A) a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a 
record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an 
impairment.”42 As a general rule of construction, the ADA provides: 
 
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall 
be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under 
title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 790 et seq.) or the 
regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title.43 
 
Following the ADA’s enactment, the EEOC issued both formal regulations44 
and “Interpretive Guidance”45 with respect to the ADA’s employment provisions.46 
                                                 
38 See S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 21 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1238, 1258; 
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 27 (1990); see also Feldblum, supra note 35, at 126–29 
(explaining that disability advocates concurred in the decision to borrow the Rehabilitation 
Act’s definition for the ADA because of the broad interpretation that definition had 
received). 
39 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(g) (2010). Throughout this Article, the appendix 
to Part 1630 will be referred to as “Interpretive Guidance.” 
40 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 30–31 (1990). 
41 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, §3(2), 104 Stat. 327, 
329 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006)). 
42 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). 
43 Id. § 12201(a). 
44 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1 to .16.  
45 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.1 to .16. 
46 The ADA provisions relating to employment are contained in Title I of the act,       
42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117.  
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In terms of the reach of the ADA’s “regarded as” prong, the EEOC Interpretive 
Guidance expressed the following view: 
 
An individual rejected from a job because of the “myths, fears and 
stereotypes” associated with disabilities would be covered under this part 
of the definition of disability, whether or not the employer’s or other 
covered entity’s perception were shared by others in the field and 
whether or not the individual’s actual physical or mental condition would 
be considered a disability under the first or second part of this 
definition.47 
 
The Interpretive Guidance goes on to conclude that an individual will be 
covered by the “regarded as” prong if he or she “can show that an employer made 
an employment decision because of a perception of disability based on ‘myth, fear 
or stereotype.’”48 
At this point, many activists and observers were optimistic that the ADA was 
structured to go a long way toward achieving the stated objective of eradicating 
disability discrimination.49 And, the “regarded as” prong was a major weapon in 
this arsenal, providing a safety valve of coverage for many individuals who did not 
otherwise qualify as having a current, functionally limited disability.50  
But the optimists overlooked one important fact: unlike the all-encompassing 
nature of race and gender under Title VII, the notion of disability under ADA is a 
term of limitation.51 While everyone has a race and gender, not everyone is 
disabled. If the threshold for establishing disability status is raised, the scope of 
protection afforded by the Act is correspondingly reduced. 
 
III.  JUDICIAL BACKLASH: THE SHRINKING CLASS OF THE DISABLED 
 
The enactment of the ADA contributed to a significant rise in the incidence of 
employment litigation. In the four years following 1991, the number of 
employment claims in federal court jumped by 128%.52 Between the ADA’s 
effective date in 1992 and the end of fiscal year 1998, claimants filed more than 
                                                 
47 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(l).  
48 Id. The interpretive guidance further states that “[i]f the employer cannot articulate 
a non-discriminatory reason for the employment action, an inference that the employer is 
acting on the basis of ‘myth, fear or stereotype’ can be drawn.” Id. 
49 See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text. 
50 See Feldblum, supra note 35, at 157. 
51 See Stephen F. Befort & Holly Lindquist Thomas, The ADA in Turmoil: Judicial 
Dissonance, the Supreme Court’s Response, and the Future of Disability Discrimination 
Law, 78 OR. L. REV. 27, 69 (1999). 
52 See Stuart H. Bompey et al., The Attack on Arbitration and Mediation of 
Employment Disputes, 13 LAB. LAW. 21, 22 (1997). 
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108,000 charges of disability discrimination with the EEOC.53 This litigation 
explosion, coupled with the rather imprecise language of the statute, resulted in 
conflicting judicial interpretations on a host of key ADA issues54 and led the 
Supreme Court to decide sixteen cases construing the ADA in a relatively short 
time span from 1998 to 2004.55 This increased activity also tested the patience of 
the federal judiciary charged with managing the caseload, as illustrated by the 
following comment: 
 
The court advised that the ADA as it was being interpreted had the 
potential of being the greatest generator of litigation ever, and that the 
court doubted whether Congress, in its wildest dreams or wildest 
nightmares, intended to turn every garden variety worker’s compensation 
claim into a federal case.56 
 
Perhaps as a partial response to the burdens of this growing caseload, federal 
court decisions began to adopt a more restrictive view of the ADA’s disability 
definition. By 1997, Arlene Mayerson, directing attorney of the Disability Rights 
Education and Defense Fund, authored an article disquietly chronicling the fact 
that a growing number of federal courts were imposing a functional limitation on 
the “regarded as” prong.57 Under this approach, courts would find a plaintiff to 
have standing only if the impairment that an employer perceived an employee to 
possess would result in a substantial limitation on a major life activity.58 From 
                                                 
53 See Befort & Thomas, supra note 51, at 29–30 (citing Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) Charges 1992-
FY 1998).  
54 See generally id. (describing ten contentious ADA issues on which the circuit 
courts and/or the EEOC took conflicting positions and also discussing the reasons for this 
widespread judicial dissonance). 
55 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533–34 (2004); Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez,      
540 U.S. 44, 55 (2003); Clackamas Gastroenterology Assoc. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440,       
446 n.6 (2003); Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189–90 (2002); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 76 (2002); U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 406 
(2002); EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 296–98 (2002); Toyota Motor Mfg., 
Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002); PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 
690 (2001); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001); 
Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 577–78 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel 
Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,    
492–94 (1999); Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 805–07 (1999); 
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 647 (1998); Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 
213 (1998). 
56 Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp., 891 F. Supp. 482, 485 (W.D. Ark. 1994), rev’d, 60 F.3d 
1300 (8th Cir. 1995). 
57 See Arlene B. Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the “Regarded As” Prong:  Giving 
Effect to Congressional Intent, 42 VILL. L. REV. 587, 590–91 (1997). 
58 Id. at 592–95. 
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Mayerson’s perspective, this additional requirement was never intended by the 
ADA’s drafters,59 and it was one that few plaintiffs could meet.60 
This was only the precursor of a much larger judicial backlash. Beginning in 
1999, the Supreme Court issued four decisions that severely narrowed the class of 
protected “disabled” employees. 
 
A.  The Supreme Court Cases 
 
The first and most significant of these decisions was the landmark case of 
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.61 Karen Sutton and Kimberly Hinton were twin 
sisters who both suffered from severe myopia.62 Each had uncorrected visual 
acuity of 20/200 in one eye and 20/400 in the other, but with corrective lenses their 
vision improved to 20/20 or better.63 In 1992, both sisters applied for employment 
with United Air Lines (United) as commercial airline pilots.64 United rejected both 
sisters because they did not meet minimum uncorrected vision requirements.65 
Petitioners brought suit under the ADA, alleging that they fit within the protected 
class of individuals with a disability due to their respective vision impairments 
(prong one), or, alternatively, because they were regarded as having a substantially 
limiting impairment (prong three).66 
The key issue in determining the twins’ prong one disability claim concerned 
whether mitigating measures should be considered in determining whether a 
person is substantially limited in a major life activity.67 The EEOC had issued 
Interpretive Guidance suggesting that the issue of disability status should be 
assessed without regard to mitigating measures.68 Under this approach, for 
example, an individual with diabetes who could perform normally with insulin 
injections, but who without insulin would lapse into a coma, would be considered 
disabled and thus protected by the ADA. The Sutton Court, in a 7-2 decision, 
disagreed, stating: 
 
It is apparent that if a person is taking measures to correct for, or 
mitigate, a physical or mental impairment, the effects of those 
measures—both positive and negative—must be taken into account when 
judging whether that person is “substantially limited” in a major life 
activity and thus “disabled” under the Act.69 
                                                 
59 Id. at 597–98. 
60 Id. at 590–91, 599. 
61 527 U.S. 471 (1999). 
62 Id. at 475. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 476. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 481–82. 
68 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(j) (1998). 
69 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482. 
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The Court rejected the agency guidance as an “impermissible interpretation of 
the ADA.”70 The Court reasoned that a person whose impairment is corrected by 
mitigating measures does not have an impairment that presently substantially 
limits a major life activity, and therefore should not be considered disabled under 
the ADA.71 The Court also stressed the importance of making an individualized 
inquiry with respect to each person asserting an ADA claim. The Court opined that 
following the EEOC’s instruction to assess claimants in an uncorrected state would 
impermissibly create a system in which persons would be treated as members of a 
group rather than as individuals.72 Finally, the Court placed great weight on 
congressional findings set out in the ADA’s preamble to the effect that the Act 
would protect some forty-three million Americans.73 The Court explained that this 
figure would be much higher if all persons with corrected conditions were intended 
to be covered by the statute.74 
The Supreme Court also rejected the alternative contention that the twins were 
protected under the ADA because they were regarded as disabled. The Sutton 
majority explained that an individual may fall within this “regarded as” prong of 
the statutory disability definition in either of two ways: “(1) a covered entity 
mistakenly believes that a person has a physical impairment that substantially 
limits one or more major life activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly believes 
that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life 
activities.”75 In either situation, the Court explained, the impairment, as perceived, 
must be one that substantially limits one or more major life activities.76 Applying 
that standard to the Sutton facts, the Court ruled that the mere allegation that an 
employer has a vision requirement does not establish that the employer regarded 
the petitioners as substantially limited in the major life activity of working.77 At 
best, the Court stated, the employer only regarded them as unable to perform the 
single job of a global airline pilot.78 
The Court issued two companion decisions on the same day as Sutton that 
reached similar results. In Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., the Court held 
that a mechanic with hypertension was not disabled or regarded as disabled when 
                                                 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 482–83. 
72 Id. at 483–84. 
73 See id. at 484 (discussing congressional findings set out in 42 U.S.C.                       
§ 12101(a)(1)). 
74 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 487. 
75 Id. at 489. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 490–91. According to the EEOC regulations, in order for an individual to be 
substantially limited in the major life activity of working, he or she must be “significantly 
restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various 
classes.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2010).  
78 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 493. 
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evaluated after considering the mitigating effect of his medication.79 In the other 
case, Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, the Court held that whether monocular 
vision is a covered disability must be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking 
into account mitigating measures including the brain’s ability to compensate for 
the loss of vision in one eye.80 
The Court further restricted the disability standing requirement three years 
later in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc v. Williams when it overturned 
a Sixth Circuit decision that had found an assembly line worker with carpal tunnel 
syndrome and tendonitis to be substantially limited in performing manual tasks 
because of her workplace difficulties in gripping tools and in performing repetitive 
work.81 The Supreme Court explained that the proper inquiry was to determine 
whether an individual has “an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the 
individual from [engaging in] activities that are of central importance to [daily 
life].”82 The Court stated that the terms “substantially limits” and “major life 
activity” “need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for 
qualifying as disabled.”83 The Court determined that the Sixth Circuit had engaged 
in an overly narrow inquiry by considering only those tasks that Williams 
performed at work, while ignoring the impairment’s impact on her nonwork 
activities.84 Since a broader view revealed that Williams could still perform 
household chores and personal hygiene activities, the Court concluded that the 
appeals court had erred in finding that she was substantially limited in performing 
manual tasks and hence disabled for purposes of the ADA.85 
 
B.  The Impact 
 
Although some critics perceived these decisions as wisely preserving the 
protections of the ADA for those who truly are disabled,86 most of the scholarly 
response was decidedly negative. The loudest detractors, including some long-time 
disability rights activists, viewed these decisions as subverting the bold civil rights 
intent of Congress in enacting the ADA.87 The clear consensus reaction, even from 
                                                 
79 Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 520–21 (1999). 
80 Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565–67 (1999). 
81 Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 192–93 (2002). 
82 Id. at 196–98. 
83 Id. at 196–97. 
84 Id. at 200–01. 
85 Id. at 201–02. The Court remanded the issue of whether Toyota Motors was entitled 
to summary judgment on the manual task issue. See id. at 202–03. 
86 See, e.g., Andrew C. Testerman, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.: The Supreme 
Court Applies “Corrective” and “Mitigating” Common Sense to the ADA, 77 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 165, 168 (1999) (arguing that the Sutton decision provides “a rational and reasoned 
interpretation of the ADA’s definition of disability resulting in a narrowed protected class 
that more closely identifies the intended beneficiaries of the Act”). 
87 See, e.g., Diller, supra note 5, at 22 (suggesting that Sutton and similar rulings 
demonstrate that the federal courts are engaged in a judicial backlash that is “systematically 
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those commentators outside the disability advocate community, was that the 
Supreme Court decisions cut too deep a swath into the ADA’s protected class.88 
The four Supreme Court decisions discussed above negatively impacted 
disability discrimination jurisprudence in at least three ways: narrowing the ADA’s 
coverage, spawning uncertainty, and enabling decisions based on stereotypes.  
 
1.  Narrowing the ADA’s Coverage 
 
The most obvious impact of these decisions was to narrow the ADA’s 
protected class and to raise the bar for ADA plaintiffs in litigation. This impact is 
demonstrated by several statistical measures. First, the timing of the Sutton 
decision correlates with a significant decline in the number of charges of alleged 
discrimination filed under the ADA. The EEOC’s charge-filing statistics show a 
drop in annual ADA charges from the 17,000 to 18,000 range during fiscal years 
1997 to 1999 to a range of 15,000 to 16,000 charges filed in each of the four fiscal 
years following the Sutton decision.89 Federal court filings for employment-based 
civil rights cases similarly declined from 23,735 in 199890 to 20,955 in 2002 and 
14,353 in 2006.91 These numbers suggest that Sutton and its progeny serve to deter 
the assertion of discrimination claims under the ADA. 
Second, several empirical studies found that the federal courts see little merit 
in those ADA claims that are asserted. Professor Ruth Colker, for example, has 
conducted a detailed analysis of decided ADA federal court decisions and reported 
that the courts have resolved approximately 93% of these cases in favor of 
employers.92 Many of these decisions are the result of summary judgment rulings 
based upon a determination that the plaintiff lacks disability status.93 Another study 
undertaken by Professor Colker revealed that the federal courts of appeal are far 
                                                                                                                            
nullifying rights that Congress conferred on people with disabilities”); Feldblum, supra 
note 35, at 161 (describing a “large, gaping wound” inflicted by Sutton and its companion 
cases). 
88 See, e.g., Lisa Eichhorn, Applying the ADA to Mitigating Measures Cases: A 
Choice of Statutory Evils, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1071, 1072 (1999); Wendy E. Parmet, Plain 
Meaning and Mitigating Measures: Judicial Interpretations of the Meaning of Disability, 
21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 53, 54 (2000). 
89 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 Charges (Includes Concurrent Charges 
with Title VII, ADEA, and EPA) FY 1997-FY 2009, U.S. EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/ 
statistics/enforcement/ada-charges.cfm (last visited Aug. 23, 2010).  
90 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS 133 (2002), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/ 
JudicialBusiness2002.aspx (follow “Table C-2A” hyperlink). 
91 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS 166 (2006), http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/JudicialBusiness 
2006.aspx (follow “Table C-2A” hyperlink). 
92 Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants,  34 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 109 (1999). 
93 See id. at 110–17; Befort & Thomas, supra note 51, at 80. 
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more likely to overturn trial court rulings favorable to ADA plaintiffs than they are 
to take similar action with respect to appeals arising under Title VII.94 
 
2.  Spawning Uncertainty 
 
Even though one of the Supreme Court’s apparent purposes in issuing these 
four decisions was to stem the rising tide of litigation under the ADA, certain 
aspects of these decisions actually caused more uncertainty and created the need 
for a continued reliance on the courts for interpretation of ADA intent. The two 
most significant of these factors were a lack of agency deference and the 
requirement of an individualized inquiry in determining disability status. 
 
(a)  Lack of Agency Deference 
 
The Sutton majority’s treatment of EEOC regulatory guidance raised serious 
doubts as to the future authority of the EEOC’s Interpretive Guidance. Given the 
ADA’s sparse and imprecise text, the panoply of EEOC interpretations offered 
perhaps the most useful roadmap available. The Sutton Court’s rejection of this 
agency guidance blurred that map to a considerable extent. 
Under the Supreme Court’s well-known Chevron doctrine, announced in 
1984, a reviewing court should adhere to an agency’s regulatory interpretation 
where a statute is silent or ambiguous and the agency interpretation is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.95 The Court in Sutton markedly withheld 
such deference to the EEOC in a number of ways. Most directly, the Court 
dismissed the position of the EEOC’s Interpretive Guidance with respect to 
mitigating measures as “an impermissible interpretation of the ADA.”96 Beyond 
directly rejecting the EEOC’s view on the mitigating measures issue, the Sutton 
opinion also raised two other warning flags concerning the status of agency 
                                                 
94 Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing under the Americans with Disabilities Act,         
62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 253–54 (2001). 
95 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 
(1984). In an earlier ADA decision, the Court invoked the Chevron doctrine in stating that 
the regulatory views of the administrative agencies charged with interpreting and enforcing 
the ADA “are entitled to deference.” Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 646 (1998) (stating 
that because agencies directed by Congress issue implementing regulations and provide 
technical assistance concerning the ADA, the “views [of the EEOC and the Department of 
Justice] are entitled to deference”). 
96 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999). Although some courts 
have suggested that the EEOC’s interpretive guidance is not entitled to full Chevron 
deference because that document is an interpretive guideline rather than a substantive 
regulation, see, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 899 n.3 (10th Cir. 
1997), it is clear that the interpretive guidance, as the enforcing agency’s interpretation 
adopted following notice and comment procedures, is entitled, at least, to some deference. 
See Colker, supra note 92, at 153–56 (arguing that the Interpretive Guidance deserves a 
high level of deference due to the EEOC’s adoption of the guidelines as an appendix to 
regulations promulgated in accordance with formal notice and comment procedures). 
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guidance under the ADA. First, the Sutton Court suggested that agency 
promulgations concerning the definition of a covered disability may not be legally 
authorized.97 More narrowly, the Sutton opinion expressed doubt as to the validity 
of the portion of the EEOC’s regulations that set out the agency’s views as to when 
an individual has standing under the ADA because of a substantial limitation on 
the major life activity of “working.”98 The Court expressed similar doubts on these 
two issues in Toyota.99 
By rejecting the EEOC’s Interpretive Guidance with respect to mitigating 
measures and suggesting (without deciding) that the EEOC’s regulations 
concerning the meaning of “disability” and “working” may be invalid, the Court 
fueled judicial reluctance to follow agency guidance. In short, the Court’s 
decisions called the EEOC’s power to issue authoritative guidance into question 
and fostered an ongoing climate of unpredictability and litigiousness. 
 
(b)  Individualized Inquiry 
 
The Supreme Court’s insistence on an individualized inquiry for determining 
disability status under the ADA also fosters unpredictability. In rejecting agency 
guidance with respect to the impact of mitigating measures, the Sutton Court 
stated, “The definition of disability also requires that disabilities be evaluated ‘with 
respect to an individual’ and be determined based on whether an impairment 
substantially limits the ‘major life activities of such individual.’ Thus, whether a 
person has a disability under the ADA is an individualized inquiry.”100 The Court 
                                                 
97 While recognizing that Congress authorized three different agencies to issue 
regulations concerning those portions of the ADA that they are entrusted to administer, the 
Court stated: “No agency, however, has been given authority to issue regulations 
implementing the generally applicable provisions of the ADA, see §§ 12101–12102, which 
fall outside Titles I-V. Most notably, no agency has been delegated authority to interpret 
the term ‘disability.’” Sutton, 527 U.S. at 479. Because neither party challenged the validity 
of the agency regulations on this ground, the Court concluded that it need not decide how 
much deference they are due. Id. at 480. 
98 Id. at 492. In this regard, the Court stated: 
 
Because the parties accept that the term “major life activities” includes 
working, we do not determine the validity of the cited regulations. We note, 
however, that there may be some conceptual difficulty in defining “major life 
activities” to include work, for it seems “‘to argue in a circle to say that if one is 
excluded, for instance, by reason of [an impairment from working with others]   
. . . then that exclusion constitutes an impairment, when the question you’re 
asking is, whether the exclusion itself is by reason of handicap.”’ 
 
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Sch. Bd. of Nassau 
Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (No. 85–1227) (argument of Solicitor General)).  
99 See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 194, 200 (2002). 
100 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483 (internal citation omitted). The Sutton Court concluded that 
the guidelines approach was inconsistent with such an individualized inquiry because it 
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in Toyota similarly stressed that an individualized inquiry is particularly necessary 
when the impairment at issue, like carpal tunnel syndrome, varies widely in 
symptoms from person to person.101 
While the Supreme Court viewed this individualized focus as beneficial, that 
certainly is a debatable proposition. At the standing stage of ADA litigation, a 
certain degree of predictability is a good thing: both employees and employers 
would benefit from knowing generally what types of impairments the ADA covers. 
An individualized focus in each and every case clearly is not conducive to that end. 
Under an individualized inquiry approach, individuals with the same 
impairment may or may not be disabled for ADA purposes, depending upon the 
degree of limitation that each individual experiences because of the impairment.102 
The Sutton Court’s mitigating measures determination aggravates this uncertainty. 
Even though corrective measures may render many impairments nondisabling, 
some employees nonetheless may be disabled because medication and treatment 
are ineffective to relieve their substantial limitation.103 In addition, the side effects 
of a treatment regimen itself could cause a substantial limitation in a major life 
activity.104 Finally, an open question exists as to the status of employees who 
could, but chose not to, use mitigating measures.105 Since the individualized 
approach inhibits the accumulation of precedent in terms of determining disability 
status, it invites continual litigation to resolve uncertain rights and obligations. 
  
                                                                                                                            
“would create a system in which persons often must be treated as members of a group of 
people with similar impairments, rather than as individuals.” Id. at 483–84. 
101 Toyota, 534 U.S. at 199. 
102 See Feldblum, supra note 35, at 152 (“[T]he idea that an individualized assessment 
would be used to determine whether one person with epilepsy would be covered under the 
law, while another person with epilepsy would not, was completely foreign both to Section 
504 jurisprudence and to the spirit of the ADA as envisioned by its advocates.”). 
103 See, e.g., Belk v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 194 F.3d 946, 948, 950 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(involving a plaintiff required to wear leg braces); Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist.,         
184 F.3d 296, 301–02 (3d Cir. 1999) (involving a plaintiff with a mental disorder). 
104 See, e.g., McAlindin v. Cnty. of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1235 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(noting that side effects of mental health medications can result in substantial impairment); 
Taylor, 184 F.3d at 309 (noting that side effects of mental health medications can result in 
substantial impairment). 
105 See Sarina Maria Russotto, Effects of the Sutton Trilogy, 68 TENN. L. REV. 705, 
716 (2001). See generally Jill Elaine Hasday, Mitigation and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 103 MICH. L. REV. 217 (2004) (arguing that employees should be under a 
duty to mitigate when doing so is reasonable and reduces their need for workplace 
accommodation); Sarah Shaw, Why Courts Cannot Deny ADA Protection to Plaintiffs Who 
Do Not Use Available Mitigating Measures for Their Impairments, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1981 
(2002) (arguing that nonmitigating employees are entitled to ADA protection from 
employment discrimination). 
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3.  Enabling Decisions Based on Stereotypes 
 
The Supreme Court’s resolution of the specific issue presented by the facts in 
Sutton is not surprising. The use of eyeglasses is so common and so successful that 
their presence does not evoke negative stereotypical perceptions concerning the 
ability of an eyeglass-wearer to function in society.106 But other impairments, such 
as missing limbs, epilepsy, and depression do evoke stereotypical assumptions that 
may hinder full participation in society and in the workplace. The Sutton Court’s 
one-size-fits-all response to the matter of mitigating measures, unfortunately, 
treated these significant conditions in the same manner as the comparatively slight 
inconvenience of correctible nearsightedness.107 
The Sutton and Murphy decisions created a particularly troublesome issue 
with respect to the “regarded as” prong of the ADA’s disability definition. The 
Court in Sutton explained that an individual is regarded as disabled if an employer 
mistakenly believes that a person’s nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one 
or more major life activities.108 On the other hand, the Sutton opinion ruled that an 
individual is not regarded as disabled simply because an employer believes that a 
person’s nonlimiting impairment precludes him or her from adequately performing 
the job at issue.109 The crucial distinction, then, is the employer’s subjective 
perception. 
Here again, this subjective inquiry may mean that two individuals who are 
similarly situated in terms of impairment could be treated disparately for ADA 
standing purposes. Take for example the situation of Karen Sutton and her twin 
sister Kimberly Hinton: each sister has uncorrected visual acuity of 20/200 or 
worse that is correctable with corrective lenses to 20/20 vision.110 Assume that 
United Air Lines decides not to hire Karen because it perceives her eyesight 
impairment as interfering with her ability to perform adequately as a global airline 
pilot. Also assume that United Air Lines decides not to hire Kimberly because it 
perceives her eyesight impairment as interfering with her ability to perform 
adequately across a class or broad range of jobs including that of a global airline 
pilot. With these assumptions, under the reasoning of the Sutton majority, 
Kimberly has standing as an individual with a disability whereas Karen does not. 
As a subjective inquiry, this individualized focus concerning the “regarded as” 
                                                 
106 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. 
REV. 397, 446, 496–97 (2000) (arguing that the class of “disabled” should include those 
individuals with impairments that subject them to systematic disadvantages in society, but 
concluding that individuals who wear corrective lenses are not subject to stigma in society 
at large). 
107 See Befort, supra note 27, at 357–58. 
108 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999); see also Murphy v. 
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 520 (1999) (reiterating the finding of the Sutton 
Court). 
109 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 494. 
110 Id. at 475. 
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prong inhibited predictability and was prone to post hoc manipulation with respect 
to the purported rationale for employment decisions.111 
As the Supreme Court recognized in an earlier decision, School Board of 
Nassau County v. Arline, a central purpose of disability discrimination legislation 
is to deter employment decisions based on “society’s accumulated myths and fears 
about disability.”112 The overly broad swath cut by the Sutton decision was 
inconsistent with this policy objective. Based on Sutton, an employer would not 
violate the ADA by deciding not to hire an insulin-aided diabetic or an individual 
wearing a prosthetic limb based upon a mistaken and stereotypic belief that the 
applicant’s underlying impairment might somehow interfere with successful job 
performance. A post-Sutton court hearing such a case would never reach the issues 
of stereotypical decision making or ability to perform the job because the 
applicants did not have standing as individuals with a disability. 
 
IV.  SEARCHING FOR A FIX 
 
A.  Scholarly Proposals 
 
Much of the widespread criticism of these four Supreme Court decisions 
narrowing the scope of the ADA’s definition of disability has been accompanied 
by proposals for reform. A brief summary of some of the most frequently 
mentioned proposals is set out below. 
The most far-reaching proposal would extend ADA protection to any 
individual with a physical or mental impairment, or to anyone who is regarded as 
having such an impairment.113 This proposal would confer standing upon any 
individual with an actual or perceived impairment regardless of whether the 
impairment resulted in any functional limitation on that individual’s ability to 
engage in any activity.114 A variation of this proposal would protect all individuals 
with an impairment that somehow limits a major life activity but would eliminate 
the troublesome “substantial limitation” requirement.115 The proponents of these 
approaches maintain that this change would mirror Title VII in terms of focusing 
                                                 
111 According to Justice Steven’s dissenting opinion in Sutton, Congress intended that 
impairments should be viewed in their unmitigated state under prong one of the disability 
definition because of the difficulty of ascertaining an employer’s subjective intent under 
prong three. See id. at 501 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting). By rejecting this viewpoint, the 
Court in Sutton amplified the importance of this difficult prong three inquiry. 
112 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987). 
113 See Lisa Eichhorn, Major Litigation Activities Regarding Major Life Activities: 
The Failure of the “Disability” Definition in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 
77 N.C. L. REV. 1405, 1473–74 (1999); Feldblum, supra note 35, at 162–64. 
114 See Eichhorn, supra note 113, at 1473–74. 
115 Cheryl L. Anderson, “Deserving Disabilities”: Why the Definition of Disability 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act Should be Revised to Eliminate the Substantial 
Limitation Requirement, 65 MO. L. REV. 83, 128–29 (2000). 
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attention on an employer’s reasons for its employment action rather than focusing 
on whether an employee is a member of the “substantially limited” subset.116 
A second proposed alternative would be to define the ADA’s protected class 
in light of the act’s antisubordination purpose. In this vein, Professor Miranda 
McGowan, while agreeing with the Sutton Court’s mitigating measures ruling, 
urges a broader reading of the “regarded as” prong, stating “it should suffice that 
an employer holds and acts on the basis of stereotypes or generalizations about the 
abilities (or dangers) of a person with an actual or perceived physical or mental 
impairment.”117 Professor Samuel Bagenstos puts it more broadly, contending that 
“the statutory ‘disability’ category should embrace those actual, past, and 
perceived impairments that subject people to systemic disadvantages in society.”118 
A narrower third alternative would be for Congress to legislatively overrule 
the Sutton decision on the mitigating measures issue. A number of state laws 
provide a model for this approach.119 In California, for example, a 2000 
amendment to the state Fair Employment and Housing Act provides that “whether 
a condition limits a major life activity shall be determined without respect to any 
mitigating measures, unless the mitigating measure itself limits a major life 
activity.”120 The Rhode Island legislature has enacted a similar measure.121 
A fourth alternative proposed by a group of legal and medical experts from 
the University of Louisville suggests that Congress should direct the EEOC to 
establish medical standards for determining when most common mental and 
physical impairments are sufficiently severe to constitute a covered disability for 
ADA purposes.122 These standards would be premised upon medical practice 
guidelines and standard diagnostic and treatment protocols following notice and 
comment rulemaking procedures.123 An individual whose medical condition met a 
promulgated standard would presumptively be covered by the ADA.124 
                                                 
116 See, e.g., Eichhorn, supra note 113, at 1473–74; Feldblum, supra note 35, at 162–
64. 
117 Miranda Oshige McGowan, Reconsidering the Americans with Disabilities Act,     
35 GA. L. REV. 27, 113 (2000). 
118 Bagenstos, supra note 106, at 445. 
119 See generally Alex Long, State Anti-discrimination Law as a Model for Amending 
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 597, 643 (2004). 
120 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12926.1(c) (West 2005). 
121 See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-6(4) (2004). 
122 Mark A. Rothstein, Serge A. Martinez & W. Paul McKinney, Using Established 
Medical Criteria to Define Disability: A Proposal to Amend the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 243, 270–71 (2002). 
123 Id. 
124 Id. According to the authors, this general rule would be subject to three exceptions: 
First, for conditions without a published medical standard, an individual could nonetheless 
assert a claim of disability discrimination by establishing the existence of an impairment 
that substantially limits a major life activity by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 271. 
Second, an employer could rebut the presumption of coverage for an employee whose 
condition satisfied the published criteria by presenting clear and convincing evidence that 
the individual’s condition did not constitute a substantial limitation of a major life activity. 
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B.  Congress Takes Action 
 
In January 2002, Representative Steny H. Hoyer (D-MD) authored an piece in 
the Washington Post.125 Representative Hoyer expressed his belief that the ADA 
had been misconstrued by the Supreme Court and stated that Congress’s 
“responsibility now is to revisit both our words and our intent in passing the ADA. 
In matters of statutory interpretation, unlike constitutional matters, Congress has 
the last word.”126 Representative Hoyer’s attitude was shared by many others, and 
as a result, Congress and disability rights groups began paving the way for 
legislation aimed at remedying the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the ADA.127 
The National Council on Disability issued an important report two years later 
recommending that the ADA be amended to define a covered disability as any 
physical or mental impairment.128 
A major legislative development occurred during the summer of 2006 when 
Congressman Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI) expressed interest in sponsoring a bill 
that would override the Supreme Court’s limiting decisions.129 In September of 
that year, Congressman Sensenbrenner joined Representatives Hoyer and John 
Conyers (D-MI) in sponsoring the first ADA Restoration Act, H.R. 6258.130 
On July 26, 2007, companion ADA Restoration bills were introduced in the 
House (H.R. 3195) and in the Senate (S. 1881).131 The bills reflected language that 
the disability community had crafted.132 Most significantly, H.R. 3195 proposed 
amending the ADA’s definition of disability to mean: “(i) a physical or mental 
impairment; (ii) a record of a physical or mental impairment; or (iii) being 
regarded as having a physical or mental impairment.”133 This proposed definition 
of disability did not require that such an impairment pose any functional limitation 
on life activities.134 
                                                                                                                            
Id. Similarly, employees who do not satisfy the presumptive standard could nonetheless 
establish covered disability status by presenting clear and convincing evidence that his or 
her impairment substantially limited a major life activity. Id. at 271–72. 
125 Steny H. Hoyer, Op-Ed., Not Exactly What We Intended, Justice O’Connor, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2002, at B1. 
126 Id. 
127 See Feldblum et al., supra note 13, at 194–95. 
128 NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, RIGHTING THE ADA 99–104 (2004), available at 
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2004/pdf/righting_ada.pdf. 
129 See Feldblum et al., supra note 13, at 195. Representative Sensenbrenner’s wife, 
Cheryl Sensenbrenner, was a board member of the American Association of People with 
Disabilities and an ardent supporter of disability rights. Id. at 195–96. 
130 H.R. 6258, 109th Cong. (2006). 
131 H.R. 3195, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1881, 110th Cong. (2007). 
132 See Feldblum et al., supra note 13, at 197–98. 
133 H.R. 3195 § 4. 
134 See id. 
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A number of business groups expressed opposition to the companion bills.135 
In testimony before a Senate Committee in November 2007, for example, a 
management attorney expressed the concern that S. 1881 would convey standing to 
any individual with an impairment, no matter how trivial the impairment, and that 
individuals with minor impairments would be entitled to reasonable 
accommodations.136 This blanket entitlement to accommodations, the attorney 
opined, would cause considerable difficulty and expense for employers.137 
Representatives Hoyer and Sensenbrenner urged disability and business 
leaders to work out their differences.138 From February to May of 2008, 
representatives of these two groups held numerous meetings and exchanged 
several drafts of proposed language.139 They finally achieved a compromise on 
May 15, 2008,140 retaining the ADA’s current definition of disability but including 
several measures designed to lower the bar for a plaintiff to establish a substantial 
limitation on a major life activity.141 A particularly significant component of the 
compromise concerned the “regarded as” prong of the disability definition. The 
Statement of the Managers accompanying the bill enacted as the ADAAA 
summarized the essential ingredients of this compromise as follows: 
 
The bill removes from the third “regarded as” prong of the disability 
definition the requirement that an individual demonstrate that he or she 
has, or is perceived to have, an impairment that substantially limits a 
major life activity. Under the bill, therefore, an individual can establish 
coverage under the law by showing that he or she has been subjected to 
an action prohibited under the Act because of an actual or perceived 
physical or mental impairment. Because the bill thus broadens 
application of this third prong of the disability definition, entities covered 
by the ADA will not be required to provide accommodations or to 
modify policies and procedures for individuals who fall solely under the 
third prong. Such entities will, however, still be subject to discrimination 
claims.142 
 
                                                 
135 See Feldblum et al., supra note 13, at 234–35. 
136 The Americans with Disabilities Act Restoration Act of 2007: Hearing on S. 1881 
Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor & Pensions, 110th Cong. 1–2, 6 (2007) 
(statement of Camille A. Olson, Partner, Seyfarth Shaw LLP). 
137 See id. at 6. 
138 See Feldblum et al., supra note 13, at 229. 
139 Id. at 229–30. As the Statement of the Managers accompanying the bill enacted as 
the ADAAA described: “S. 3406 is the product of an extensive bipartisan effort that 
included many hours of meetings and negotiation by legislative staff as well as by 
stakeholders including the disability, business, and education communities.” 154 CONG. 
REC. S8344 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008). 
140 See Feldblum et al., supra note 13, at 230. 
141 Id. at 236. 
142 154 CONG. REC. S8344. 
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A slightly revised version of the ADAA was introduced on July 31, 2008 as S. 
3406.143 Both houses of Congress passed the bill unanimously,144 and President 
Bush signed the ADAAA into law on September 25, 2008.145 
 
V.  THE ADAAA 
 
The ADAAA, which went into effect on January 1, 2009,146 explicitly 
disavows the reasoning of the four Supreme Court decisions that narrowed the 
scope of the ADA’s disability definition.147 Although the ADA’s basic definition 
of disability remains intact, the ADAAA emphasizes that the definition of 
disability should be broadly construed148 and clarifies how the terms “substantially 
limits,” “major life activities,” and “regarded as” are to be construed.149 A principal 
objective of the ADAAA is to refocus the ADA on issues of discrimination rather 
than on issues of standing.150 
 
A.  The ADAAA’s Definition of Disability 
 
According to the ADAAA, “the term ‘disability’ means, with respect to an 
individual—(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or 
more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; 
or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.”151 Thus, the ADA’s prior 
three-pronged definition of disability has largely been retained.152 The definition’s 
meaning, however, has been clarified and expanded in several ways. 
  
                                                 
143 S. 3406, 110th Cong. § 1 (2008). 
144 154 CONG. REC. S8342 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008); 154 CONG. REC. H8286 (daily 
ed. Sept. 17, 2008). 
145 See ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 
3553. 
146 ADAAA, sec. 8. 
147 See id. sec. 2(b) (3)-(5). 
148 Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(4)(A) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A)) (“The 
definition of disability in this Act shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of 
individuals under this Act, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this Act.”). 
149 See infra Part V.A. 
150 See 154 CONG. REC. S8344 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008).  
151 ADAAA, sec. 4(a), § 3(1)(A)–(C) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §12102(1)(A)–(C)). 
152 H.R. 3195, 110th Cong. (2007), as passed by the House of Representatives, 
proposed replacing the term “substantially limits” with the phrase “materially restricts.” 
The Senate sponsors jettisoned this change in language, concluding “that adopting a new, 
undefined term that is subject to widely disparate meanings is not the best way to achieve 
the goal of ensuring consistent and appropriately broad coverage under this Act.”             
154 CONG. REC. S8345. 
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1.  Substantially Limits 
 
The ADAAA explicitly states that one of the purposes of the Act is to reject 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “substantially limits” in Sutton and Toyota 
because it “created an inappropriately high level of limitation necessary to obtain 
coverage under the ADA.”153 Specifically, the ADAAA rejects the rule enunciated 
in Toyota that the terms “substantially” and “major” “need to be interpreted strictly 
to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled,” and that to be 
substantially limited in performing a major life activity under the ADA “an 
individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the 
individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s 
daily lives.”154 Accordingly, the ADAAA states that “the primary object of 
attention . . . should be whether entities covered under the ADA have complied 
with their obligations, and . . . the question of whether an individual’s impairment 
is a disability under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis.”155 
In order to achieve this goal, the ADAAA amends the ADA’s definition of the 
term “substantially limits” in several ways. First, the ADAAA “deletes two 
findings in the ADA which led the Supreme Court to unduly restrict the meaning 
and application of the definition of disability.”156 The deleted findings stated that 
“some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities” 
and that “individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority.”157 By 
deleting these findings, Congress intended to remove “this barrier to construing 
and applying the definition of disability more generously.”158 
Second, the ADAAA rejects the rule enunciated by the Supreme Court in the 
Sutton trilogy “that whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity 
is to be determined with reference to the ameliorative effects of mitigating 
measures. ”159 Such measures include: 
 
(I) medication, medical supplies, equipment, or appliances, low-vision 
devices (which do not include ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses), 
prosthetics including limbs and devices, hearing aids and cochlear 
implants or other implantable hearing devices, mobility devices, or 
oxygen therapy equipment and supplies; (II) use of assistive technology; 
                                                 
153 ADAAA, sec. 2(b)(5). 
154 Id. sec. 2(b)(4) (quoting Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 
197, 198 (2002)). 
155 Id. sec. 2(b)(5). 
156 154 CONG. REC. S8344. 
157 Id.  
158 Id. 
159 ADAAA, sec. 2(b)(2) (quoting Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475 
(1999)). 
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(III) reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids or services; or (IV) 
learned behavioral or adaptive neurological modifications.160 
 
The ADAAA, however, recognizes an exception in that “the ameliorative 
effects of the mitigating measures of ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses shall be 
considered in determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life 
activity.”161 The ADAAA provides that, notwithstanding the above language, “a 
covered entity shall not use qualification standards, employment tests, or other 
selection criteria based on an individual’s uncorrected vision unless the standard, 
test, or other selection criteria, as used by the covered entity, is shown to be job-
related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.”162 
Third, the ADAAA addresses the challenges that some individuals have faced 
when trying to establish that they have a substantially limiting impairment when 
that condition is episodic in nature. According to a rule of construction 
incorporated in the ADAAA, “an impairment that is episodic or in remission is a 
disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active.”163 This 
change is noteworthy because the “Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that 
courts should refrain from engaging in hypothetical inquiries as to the severity of 
impairments and instead must focus on the individual in his or her present state.”164 
As a result of this change, however, courts are directed to speculate as to an 
impairment’s future course when considering whether an episodic impairment 
would substantially limit a major life activity when active. 
Lastly, although the ADAAA does not explicitly define the meaning of 
“substantially limits,” it does state “that the current Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission ADA regulations defining the term ‘substantially limits’ 
as ‘significantly restricted’ are inconsistent with congressional intent, by 
expressing too high a standard.”165 Accordingly, the ADAAA expresses 
Congress’s expectation that the EEOC “will revise that portion of its current 
regulations that defines the term ‘substantially limits’ as ‘significantly restricted’ to 
be consistent with [the ADAAA].”166 
 
2.  Major Life Activities 
 
Under the ADA, the determination of whether an activity constitutes a major 
life activity was left to the EEOC and the courts.167 The ADAAA changes this by 
including in the statute an illustrative list of major life activities. The activities 
                                                 
160 Id. sec 4(a), §3(4)(E)(i) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i)). 
161 Id. sec. 4(a), §3(4)(E)(ii) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(ii)). 
162 Id. sec. 5(c) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12113(c)). 
163 Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(4)(D) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D)).  
164 Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act: 
Assessing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 217, 221 (2008). 
165 ADAAA, sec. 2(a)(8) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 note). 
166 Id. sec. 2(b)(6) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 note).  
167 See Befort & Thomas, supra note 51, at 34. 
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listed “include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, 
seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, 
breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and 
working.”168 In addition, the ADAAA explicitly includes major bodily functions in 
the statutory definition of major life activities.169 As a result, some individuals will 
be able to establish coverage under the Act without describing the activities in 
which they are limited so long as they have a serious medical condition that results 
in a substantial limitation on a major bodily function. 
The ADAAA also contains a rule of construction that clarifies that “an 
impairment that substantially limits one major life activity need not limit other 
major life activities in order to be considered a disability.”170 According to the 
congressional history, this was “intended to clarify that the ability to perform one 
or more particular tasks within a broad category of activities does not preclude 
coverage under the ADA.”171 
 
3.  The “Regarded As” Prong 
 
The revised treatment of the “regarded as” prong is a central component of the 
ADAAA compromise.172 One of Congress’s goals in enacting the ADAAA was to 
reject the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Sutton and “reinstate the reasoning of 
the Supreme Court in [Arline,] which set forth a broad view of the third prong of 
the definition of handicap under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.”173 As a result, 
under the amended version of the statute, an individual meets the “regarded as” 
prong of disability “if the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected 
to an action prohibited under this Act because of an actual or perceived physical or 
mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a 
major life activity.”174 Accordingly, unlike the first and second prong of the 
disability definition, courts will not have to address whether an impairment 
functionally limits a major life activity when an individual is alleging 
discrimination under the “regarded as” prong.175 
                                                 
168 ADAAA, sec. 4(a), § 3(2)(A) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)). 
169 Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(2)(B) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B)) (“[A] major life 
activity also includes the operation of a major bodily function, including but not limited to, 
functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, 
neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.”). 
170 Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(4)(C) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(C)).  
171 154 CONG. REC. S8346 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008). 
172 See 154 CONG. REC. S8344. 
173 ADAAA, sec. 2(b)(3) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 note); see also supra 
Part II.A. 
174 Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(3)(a) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A)).  
175 See 154 CONG. REC. S8346 (“Under this bill, the third prong of the disability 
definition will apply to impairments, not only to disabilities. As such, it does not require a 
functional test to determine whether an impairment substantially limits a major life 
activity.”). 
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As a compromise for this broad coverage, Congress inserted two important 
statutory limitations. The first limitation is that the “regarded as” prong does “not 
apply to impairments that are transitory and minor.”176 The second limitation is 
that a reasonable accommodation does not need to be provided “to an individual 
who meets the definition of disability . . . solely under” the “regarded as” prong.177 
As a result, employers will only have to provide reasonable accommodations to 
individuals who actually have an impairment that substantially limits a major life 
activity and not to individuals who are simply regarded as disabled. 
The ADA’s latter limitation effectively resolves a circuit split that had existed 
on the issue of whether an individual who is regarded as disabled is entitled to a 
reasonable accommodation.178 The Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits had 
ruled that employers do not have a duty to accommodate employees who only are 
regarded as disabled.179 These courts generally focused on the “bizarre” windfall 
that would result if employers were obligated to accommodate disabilities that do 
not actually exist.180 The First, Third, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, on the other 
hand, had ruled that employers must provide reasonable accommodations to 
employees regarded as disabled.181 These courts generally focused on the plain 
language of the ADA and on the policy of trying to deter adverse actions based on 
stereotypes.182 Under the “regarded as” compromise, Congress sided with the first 
group of courts. 
The pertinent legislative history provides some additional insights into 
Congressional intent with regard to the “regarded as” compromise. While 
Congress retained a somewhat watered-down “substantially limits” standard for 
prong one coverage, it opted for a much broader prong three reach in order to 
combat discrimination based on stereotypical perceptions.183 Under this approach, 
the “regarded as” prong encompasses any individual who is treated adversely 
because of an actual or perceived impairment, without regard for whether that 
                                                 
176 ADAAA, sec. 4(a), § 3(3)(B) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B)).  
177 Id. sec. 6(a)(1) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12201(h)); see also 154 CONG. REC. 
S8354 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“[S. 3406] balances [the expanded coverage of the 
‘regarded as’ prong] by limiting the remedies available under this provision.”). 
178 See generally Sarah J. Parrot, The ADA and Reasonable Accommodation of 
Employees Regarded as Disabled: Statutory Fact or Bizarre Fiction?, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1495 (2006) (summarizing a prior circuit split on the issue of whether an individual who is 
only “regarded as” disabled is entitled to a reasonable accommodation). 
179 See Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1231 (9th Cir. 2003); Weber 
v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916–917 (8th Cir. 1999); Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,        
165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir. 1999); Newberry v. E. Tex. State Univ., 161 F.3d 276, 280  
(5th Cir. 1998). 
180 See, e.g., Weber, 186 F.3d at 916–17. 
181 See, e.g., Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 773–74       
(3d Cir. 2004). 
182 See D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1235 (11th Cir. 2005); 
Kelly v. Metallics W. Inc., 410 F.3d 670, 675–76 (10th Cir. 2005); Williams, 380 F.3d at 
772–76; Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 32–34 (1st Cir. 1996). 
183 See 154 CONG. REC. S8344 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008). 
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impairment imposes any functional limitation on the individual’s activities.184 
Significantly, “the ‘regarded as’ prong [now] focuses on how an individual is 
treated, rather than on the difficult to prove perception of a covered entity.”185 As a 
trade-off for this expanded coverage, the “regarded as” compromise relieves 
employers from any responsibility for providing reasonable accommodations to 
those who are disabled solely by virtue of the “regarded as” prong.186 The Senate 
Statement of the Managers commented on this compromise, stating that while 
“some members continue to have reservations about this [no required 
accommodation] provision . . . we believe it is an acceptable compromise given 
our strong expectation that such individuals would now be covered under the first 
prong of the definition, properly applied.”187 
 
B.  Other Changes 
 
1.  On the Basis of Disability 
 
The ADAAA altered the ADA’s antidiscrimination formula. Prior to the 2008 
amendments, the statute provided that “no covered entity shall discriminate against 
a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual 
in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of 
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and 
privileges of employment.”188 The ADAAA changed this general rule by deleting 
the language “with a disability because of the disability of such individual,” and 
replacing it with “on the basis of disability.”189 As a result, “the amendments 
conform the ADAAA with the structure of Title VII and other civil rights laws.”190 
According to the Senate’s Statement of the Managers Report, this change “ensures 
that the emphasis in questions of disability discrimination is properly on the 
critical inquiry of whether a qualified person has been discriminated against on the 
                                                 
184 See H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 13 (2008). 
185 See Feldblum et al., supra note 13, at 236. 
186 154 CONG. REC. S8344 (“Because the bill thus broadens application of this third 
prong of the disability definition, entities covered by the ADA will not be required to 
provide accommodations or to modify policies and procedures for individuals who fall 
solely under the third prong.”).  
187 154 CONG. REC. S8347.  
188 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006). 
189 ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 5(a)(1), 122 
Stat. 3553, 3557 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)) (“No covered entity shall 
discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job 
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee 
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”). 
190 Lawrence Lorber et al., Back to the Future: Restoring the ADA’s Original Intent, 
HR ADVISOR, Nov.–Dec. 2008, at 6, 10. 
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basis of disability, and not unduly focused on the preliminary question of whether 
a particular person is a ‘person with a disability.’”191 
 
2.  No Reverse Discrimination 
 
The ADAAA also adds a provision stating that there can be no “reverse 
discrimination” claims under the Act. Specifically, the ADAAA states that it does 
not “provide the basis for a claim by an individual without a disability that the 
individual was subject to discrimination because of the individual’s lack of 
disability.”192 As a result, “nondisabled employees cannot claim [that they were 
discriminated against] because they were treated less favorably or were not given 
the same accommodations” as disabled employees.193 
 
3.  Regulatory Authority 
 
In Sutton, the Supreme Court stated that that “no agency . . . has been given 
authority to issue regulations implementing the [introductory] provisions of the 
ADA, which fall outside Titles I-V.”194 Since the definition of disability appeared 
in the general provisions of the ADA, the Court questioned the degree of deference 
that it needed to give to the EEOC regulations.195 The ADAAA addressed this 
issue by clarifying the scope of authority given to the EEOC to issue regulations 
interpreting the disability definition. The Act now explicitly states that the 
authority given to the EEOC, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of 
Transportation to issue regulations “under this chapter includes the authority to 
issue regulations implementing the definitions of disability in section 3 (including 
rules of construction) and the definitions in section 4, consistent with the ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008.”196 There is a chance, however, that this could result in 
some confusion because “while all of these agencies are directed to broadly 
interpret the law to cover persons with disabilities, they may do so with different 
results unless they all agree to abide by the same set of regulations.”197 
  
                                                 
191 154 CONG. REC. S8347. 
192 ADAAA, sec. 6(a)(1) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12201(g)). 
193 Margaret Hart Edwards & Patrick F. Martin, Congress Tells the Courts How to 
Interpret the ADA, ASAP (Littler Mendelson, P.C.), Sept. 2008, at 1, 3, available at 
http://www.littler.com/PressPublications/Documents/2008_09_ASAP_CongressTells_Cour
tsHowTo-InterpretADA.pdf. 
194 527 U.S. 471, 479 (1999) (citation omitted). 
195 Id. at 479–80. 
196 ADAAA, sec. 6(a)(2) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12205(a)). 
197 John W. Parry & Amy L. Allbright, The ADA Amendments Act of 2008: Analysis 
and Commentary, 32 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 695, 696 (2008). 
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VI.  LIKELY IMPACT AND LINGERING QUESTIONS 
 
A.  The Expanded Class of Individuals with a Disability 
 
The most obvious impact of the ADAAA is that it broadly expands the class 
of individuals considered to have a disability. It also readjusts the focus of the 
ADA away from the troublesome issue of standing to that of determining the 
substance of disability discrimination claims. 
The ADAAA undoes much of the damage inflicted by the Supreme Court’s 
four narrowing decisions. By systematically overriding the most egregious rulings 
announced in these decisions, the ADAAA will inevitably extend the protections 
of the ADA to a much larger class of disabled individuals. 
A brief review of the major changes wrought by the ADAAA demonstrates 
this point. Prior to the ADAAA, courts generally found that individuals who could 
ameliorate the impact of an impairment by means of mitigating measures were not 
disabled. Most courts, for example, applying the principles espoused in Sutton and 
Murphy, concluded that individuals who could control their diabetes through 
medication were not disabled.198 The ADAAA alters this analysis by now requiring 
that the “determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life 
activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating 
measures . . . .”199 As the Supreme Court noted in Sutton, “courts would almost 
certainly find all diabetics to be disabled” if evaluated in an unmitigated state.200 
Similar shifts in outcomes likely will result for other conditions that can be 
ameliorated through medication, such as epilepsy and depression. 
Similarly, most courts prior to the ADAAA found chronic illnesses that are 
episodic in their symptoms were not disabling. For example, a number of courts 
found cancer was not a disabling condition because its effects were episodic and 
subject to periods of remission.201 The ADAAA alters this analysis by providing as 
a rule of construction that “an impairment that is episodic or in remission is a 
disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active.”202 This 
alteration likely means that far more individuals with episodic conditions, 
including cancer, asthma, and hepatitis B, will now be covered by the ADA. 
                                                 
198 See, e.g., Greenburg v. Bellsouth Commc’ns, Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1264 (11th Cir. 
2007); Wilson v. MVM, Inc., 475 F.3d 166, 179 (3d Cir. 2007); Scheerer v. Potter, 443 
F.3d 916, 919–22 (7th Cir. 2006). 
199 ADAAA, sec. 4(a), §3(4)(E)(i) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i)). 
200 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999); see also Arnold v. 
United Parcel Serv. Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 859 (1st Cir. 1998) (finding, in a pre-Sutton 
decision, an individual with diabetes to be disabled when evaluated in an unmitigated 
state). 
201 See, e.g., Garrett v. Univ. of Ala., 507 F.3d 1306, 1315 (11th Cir. 2007); Ellison v. 
Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 190–91 (5th Cir. 1996). 
202 ADAAA, sec. 4(a), § 3(4)(D) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.§ 12102(4)(D)). 
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The ADAAA’s explicit recognition of an expanded set of major life activity 
categories also will convey standing on more individuals with impairments.203 In 
this regard, the ADAAA’s treatment of major bodily functions as major life 
activities is particularly significant.204 Prior to the 2008 amendments, a bodily 
function impairment constituted a disability only if that impairment substantially 
limited some major life activity such as breathing, seeing, or working.205 The 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, held that an individual with liver 
failure was not disabled unless the individual could show that this bodily 
impairment constituted a substantial limitation on some major life activity.206 
Under the ADAAA, a substantial limitation on a bodily function itself is sufficient 
for disability status.207 
The ADAAA’s revision of the “regarded as” prong likely will constitute the 
largest area of coverage expansion. Under Sutton and Murphy, an employee was 
“regarded as” disabled only if the employer perceived the impairment as one that 
substantially limited a major life activity.208 Thus, many courts found that 
employers did not regard individuals with back problems as disabled when they 
were perceived as unable to perform a single job as opposed to a class or broad 
range of jobs.209 The ADAAA dramatically broadens the reach of the “regarded as” 
prong to now encompass any individual who is treated adversely because of an 
actual or perceived impairment, regardless of the impairment’s functional 
impact.210 This change should provide protection against disability discrimination 
to many individuals with bad backs, allergies, and carpal tunnel syndrome. 
As a final measure, the congressional findings included in the ADAAA state 
that the current EEOC regulations defining the term “substantially limits” set too 
high a standard,211 and the Act expresses the expectation that the EEOC will revise 
that portion of its regulations.212 The impact of this step is unclear at this point 
since the regulations have not yet been promulgated, and it is unclear how much 
deference the courts will give to the EEOC’s pronouncements once they are in 
place. However, it is likely that this less specific step also will serve to expand the 
ADA’s coverage. 
                                                 
203 See supra Part V.A.2. 
204 ADAAA, sec. 4(a), § 3(2)(B) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.§ 12102(2)(B)). 
205 See, e.g., Fiscus v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 385 F.3d 378, 385 (3d. Cir. 2004) (ruling 
that kidney failure may be disabling if it substantially limits an individual’s ability to 
eliminate waste from the blood); Blanks v. Sw. Bell Commc’ns, Inc., 310 F.3d 398, 401 
(5th Cir. 2002) (ruling that positive HIV status was not disabling for an individual who did 
not want to have any more children). 
206 See Furnish v. SVI Sys., Inc., 270 F.3d 445, 450 (7th Cir. 2001). 
207 ADAAA, sec. 4(a), § 3(2)(B) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B)). 
208 See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
209 See, e.g., Tice v. Ctr. Area Transp. Auth., 247 F.3d 506, 512 (3d Cir. 2001); Dupre 
v. Charter Behavioral Health Sys. of Layfeyette, Inc., 242 F.3d 610, 615 (5th Cir. 2001). 
210 ADAAA, sec. 4(a), § 3(3)(A) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A)). 
211 Id. sec. 2(a)(8). 
212 Id. sec. 2(b)(6). 
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As the legislative history recites, a central purpose of the ADAAA expansion 
in disability coverage is to ensure “that the emphasis in questions of disability 
discrimination is properly on the critical inquiry of whether a qualified person has 
been discriminated against on the basis of disability, and not unduly focused on the 
preliminary question of whether a particular person is a ‘person with a 
disability.’”213 As a practical matter, however, the new focus likely will center 
more on whether an individual is qualified to perform the job in question. Unlike 
Title VII cases in which the crucial question generally is whether an employer has 
acted because of some protected trait, the crucial issue in most disability cases is 
whether the plaintiff is qualified to perform the job in spite of his or her 
disability.214 This switch in focus is a positive adjustment. Basing workplace 
decisions on qualifications rather than preconceptions is a central tenet of 
antidiscrimination legislation.215 An important corollary benefit of the ADAAA’s 
expanded reach—particularly with regard to the reinvigorated scope of the 
“regarded as” prong—is that it inhibits the type of stereotypical decision making 
enabled by the Sutton and Murphy decisions. 
In short, by expanding the class of individuals with a covered disability, 
clarifying the EEOC’s regulatory authority, and reducing the possibility of 
decisions based on stereotypes, the ADAAA effectively corrects most of the 
damage done by the four errant Supreme Court cases discussed earlier in this 
Article.216 The good news then is that the ADA once again appears poised to 
provide “a national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities.”217 
 
B.  Lingering Questions 
 
While the ADAAA clearly is a positive step for the proponents of disability 
rights, some lingering questions remain. Most of these questions relate to the 
“regarded as” compromise. The answers to these questions need to be monitored 
carefully over the next few years to ensure that the judiciary does not again 
undercut the affirmative civil rights mission of the ADA. 
 
                                                 
213 154 CONG. REC. S8347 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008). 
214 See Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1185–87 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (explaining that the 
issue of discriminatory causation is less significant in disability cases than in other types of 
discrimination cases because employers in disability cases are more likely to admit that 
their decision was disability-related, but then argue that the employee was unqualified due 
to the disabling condition). 
215 See generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) (“Far from 
disparaging job qualifications as such, Congress has made such qualifications the 
controlling factor, so that race, religion, nationality, and sex become irrelevant. What 
Congress has commanded is that any tests used must measure the person for the job and not 
the person in the abstract.”). 
216 See supra Part II.A. 
217 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2006). 
2010] 2008 ADA AMENDMENTS “REGARDED AS” 1023 
1.  Do Individuals Who Are Regarded As Disabled Need a Reasonable 
Accommodation in Order to Be Qualified for the Job? 
 
Some commentators believe that individuals who only are regarded as 
disabled do not need or deserve a reasonable accommodation. Professors Pamela 
Karlan and George Rutherglen describe individuals wrongly perceived as disabled 
as victims of “traditional [nondisability] discrimination” for whom reasonable 
accommodation is an irrelevant concept.218 Professor Cheryl Anderson 
recommends that individuals who are only “regarded as” disabled should not be 
entitled to a reasonable accommodation because “no function of the individual is 
impaired” and “the condition of the person has no real connection to the ability to 
do the job.”219 
A number of pre-ADAAA court decisions ruling that an employer had no 
obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation to an employee who is only 
regarded as disabled share this view. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated 
that a contrary interpretation would lead to “bizarre results” by entitling such an 
employee “to accommodations for a non-disabling impairment that no similarly 
situated employees would enjoy.”220 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
concluded that “to require accommodation for those not truly disabled would 
compel employers to waste resources unnecessarily, when the employers’ limited 
resources would be better spent assisting those persons who are actually disabled 
and in genuine need of accommodation to perform to their potential.”221 
Arguably, this view is correct for individuals who are mistakenly perceived to 
have an impairment when, in fact, they have no impairment at all. But that is not 
necessarily the case for an individual who “has a physical or mental impairment 
that does not substantially limit major life activities but is treated by a covered 
entity as constituting such limitation.”222 Individuals who have an impairment that 
is not substantially limiting may nonetheless need a reasonable accommodation to 
be qualified for the job. 
Consider the following hypothetical situation: Nancy is an employee who 
works on an assembly line. Due to her carpal tunnel syndrome, she has difficulty in 
making repetitive motions above shoulder height. This impairment, however, does 
not substantially limit her ability to work in either a class of jobs or a broad range 
of jobs. If her employer discharges or demotes Nancy because of her impairment, 
she meets the test for disability under the “regarded as” prong of the amended 
ADA, and she would be protected against these acts of discrimination if she were 
qualified to perform the job.223 But under the “regarded as” compromise, she 
would not be entitled to a reasonable accommodation to assist her in being able to 
                                                 
218 See Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and 
Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 8 (1996). 
219 Anderson, supra note 115, at 132–33. 
220 Weber v. Strippit, Inc. 186 F.3d 907, 916 (8th Cir. 1999). 
221 Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2003). 
222 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1) (2010). 
223 See supra notes 173–175 and accompanying text. 
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perform this or another job. What type of reasonable accommodations might she 
need? She might request a restructured work schedule to enable her to attend 
physical therapy sessions. She might request the employer to reallocate the 
performance of nonessential function, such as placing unneeded parts on a high 
storage shelf, to another employee. Or she might request a reassignment to a 
vacant position for which she is qualified. Each of these requests likely would 
constitute a reasonable accommodation that an employer would be obligated to 
provide for someone with a prong one or prong two disability,224 but they would 
not be required to provide for someone like Nancy who is disabled solely under 
prong three. If she were not qualified for the job without one of these 
accommodations, the employer would not run afoul of the new ADA in 
terminating Nancy’s employment. 
This hypothetical demonstrates an undesirable subset of disability 
discrimination that is permissible under the “regarded as” compromise. The overall 
significance of this shortcoming depends on just how many individuals share 
Nancy’s circumstances. 
 
2.  How Many Individuals with Impairments Who Need Reasonable 
Accommodations Will Qualify for Prong One Disability Status? 
 
The ADAAA’s legislative history indicates that legislators who had 
misgivings about relinquishing the reasonable accommodation requirement for 
those individuals covered solely by prong three of the disability definition 
ultimately decided that it was “an acceptable compromise given our strong 
expectation that such individuals would now be covered under the first prong of 
the definition, properly applied.”225 In other words, the expectation is that 
individuals with impairments that were not deemed to be substantially limiting 
prior to the adoption of the ADAAA will now be covered by the expanded scope 
of prong one and thereby be entitled to reasonable accommodations. 
Perhaps that may be the case, but this outcome is not inevitable. While it is 
true that Congress adopted a number of measures that will expand the scope of 
prong-one coverage, it did not alter that prong’s basic formula. In order to have 
standing under prong one, an individual still must establish that he or she has “a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life 
activities.”226 Rather than expressly lowering the bar posed by the “substantially 
                                                 
224 See generally Stephen F. Befort, The Most Difficult ADA Reasonable 
Accommodation Issues: Reassignment and Leave of Absence, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
439, 444–45 (2002) (describing five categories of reasonable accommodations under the 
ADA). 
225 154 CONG. REC. S8347 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008); see also Feldblum et al., supra 
note 13, at 238–39. 
226 ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, sec. 4(a), § 
3(1)(A), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)). 
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limits” language, Congress decided to punt and let the EEOC define that term in 
revised regulations.227 
We have been down this road before. The original version of the ADA used 
the same “substantially limits” language and the EEOC followed by issuing 
relatively broad interpretive guidelines. But the courts ignored or disapproved of 
many of the most significant guidelines and interpreted the term “substantially 
limits” narrowly. It is possible that something similar could happen again. Courts 
are generally prone to read legislative overrides narrowly and continue the viability 
of judicial principles that appear at face value to have been rejected by the 
legislature.228 More specifically, the judiciary has a natural incentive to guard its 
dockets against a litigation deluge unleashed by revised legislation and broad 
agency guidance.229 And as Professor Matthew Diller has cogently argued, “courts 
do not fully grasp, let alone accept, the [ADA’s] reliance on a civil rights model 
for addressing problems that people with disabilities face in the workplace.”230 
Instead, many judges view ADA cases “as requests for special benefits made by 
employees who are performing poorly.”231 
That makes this second question a very important one in terms of determining 
whether the “regarded as” compromise was a good or bad strategy. If the revamped 
prong one does not absorb most of those individuals sharing Nancy’s 
circumstances, the subset of people regarded as disabled but not adequately 
protected under the ADA may be much larger than anticipated. 
 
3.  Will Courts Really Undertake a Two-Step Analysis of Disability Status under 
the Amended Statute? 
 
Following the ADAAA, a court may be required to undertake two different 
analytical inquiries into disability status in a single ADA case. One type of 
analysis is needed to determine whether a plaintiff has standing to assert an ADA 
claim. A plaintiff can establish standing to assert a disability discrimination claim 
under any prong of the ADA’s three-prong definition.232 A second type of analysis 
may be necessary if a plaintiff requests a reasonable accommodation in order to 
meet the qualifications for the job in question. Under the amended statute, an 
employer is obligated to provide a reasonable accommodation only for a plaintiff 
who establishes disability status under either prong one or prong two.233 Therefore, 
it is possible that a court may undertake a prong three analysis with respect to the 
                                                 
227 See Long, supra note 164, at 219. 
228 See Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: 
Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511, 513–36 
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former issue and a prong one or prong two analysis with respect to the latter issue 
in the same case. 
While the ADAAA clearly contemplates both types of analysis, it is 
conceivable that courts will be tempted to stop at a single “regarded as” inquiry for 
at least two reasons. First, determining disability status under the new “regarded 
as” prong is an easier task than determining whether an individual is substantially 
limited in a major life activity. All a court must decide under the “regarded as” 
prong is whether an employer treats an employee adversely because of the 
employee’s impairment.234 No “substantially limits” measuring stick is required. 
Second, a number of courts have expressed reluctance to go beyond determining 
the presence of discriminatory treatment in disability cases to consider whether an 
employee is also entitled to an accommodation to assist performance ability.235 
Such an inquiry is not required under other antidiscrimination statutes, and some 
courts would prefer to read the ADA as not requiring any affirmative preferences 
in the form of reasonable accommodations.236 Thus, stopping at the “regarded as” 
inquiry may be both convenient and more palatable for some courts. 
Developments under the 2008 amendments should be closely followed to 
ensure that such a shortcut does not become common. Indeed, one would hope that 
the anticipated EEOC regulations will expressly endorse a two-step analysis. 
Perhaps the best way to accomplish this would be for the regulations to urge a 
sequential approach in which the prong one (or prong two) analysis occurs first. 
This would keep the issue of reasonable accommodation at the forefront while 
retaining prong three as a safety valve against discrimination in situations where no 
other statutory coverage is available.237 
 
                                                 
234 See supra notes 171–175 and accompanying text. 
235 See, e.g., Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[W]e do 
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4.  What Is a “Transitory and Minor” Impairment Excluded from Coverage under 
the “Regarded As” Prong? 
 
A final component of the “regarded as” compromise is the ADAAA’s 
exclusion of “transitory and minor” impairments.238 This exclusion was adopted as 
a means to temper the otherwise considerable expansion of the “regarded as” 
coverage accomplished by the elimination of any functional limitation 
requirement.239 According to a House committee report, the inclusion of this 
exception “responds to concerns raised by members of the employer community 
regarding potential abuse of the Act and the misapplication of resources on 
individuals with minor ailments that last only a short period of time.”240 The 
unknown scope of this exclusion presents a fourth lingering question. 
The ADAAA defines only one of the two operational terms used in this 
exclusion: it defines a “transitory impairment” as “an impairment with an actual or 
expected duration of 6 months or less.”241 The Act provides no inkling as to what 
is meant by a minor impairment, but a House committee report explains that 
without this exception the third “regarded as” prong of the disability definition 
would extend to “common ailments like the cold or flu.”242 
The “transitory and minor” exception gives rise to at least three interpretative 
concerns. The first concern relates to the meaning of the term “minor.” Since the 
ADAAA eliminates the “substantial limitation” requirement for “regarded as” 
claims,243 the term must refer to an impairment that has some lesser type of impact. 
But the dividing line between major and minor impairments is unclear. What is 
clear is that the “minor” impairment exclusion will generate considerable 
uncertainly and litigation. 
Second, it is not clear from the act’s definition of transitory whether the actual 
or the expected duration of an impairment should be more influential in a situation 
where the actual and expected duration differ from each other. Take for example 
the situation of an employee who has a minor impairment with an expected 
duration of five months, is discriminated against by her employer on the basis of 
her impairment during the third month, and ends up having the impairment for 
eight months. Is this employee prohibited from bringing a claim in month eight 
since the discrimination occurred during the time when she had a minor 
impairment with an expected duration of less than six months? Or will she be 
allowed to assert a “regarded as” claim since the impairment turned out to have an 
actual duration of more than six months? Because the plain language excludes 
impairments with either “an actual or expected duration of less than 6 months,”244 
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the former interpretation likely is stronger. But this is a question that the courts 
ultimately will have to decide. 
Third, there is a danger that the “transitory and minor” exception will be read 
in the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive. As written, the exception applies 
only to impairments that are both “transitory and minor,”245 such that a minor 
impairment with a duration of more than six months apparently is covered by the 
“regarded as” prong. It is not inconceivable, however, that courts hostile to 
disability discrimination claims246 will read the exclusion to extend to claims 
involving either transitory or minor impairments. Similar twists in interpretation 
have occurred in other controversial contexts.247 Such a distorted construction, of 
course, could significantly narrow the reach of the new “regarded as” prong. 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
Congress initially enacted the ADA in 1990 as a seemingly expansive civil 
rights statute aimed at eradicating disability discrimination, but a judicial backlash, 
highlighted by four Supreme Court cases, narrowly interpreted the ADA’s 
disability standing requirement and undercut the statute’s effectiveness. Operating 
in a “let’s try this again” mode, Congress enacted the ADAAA in 2008 as a 
multifaceted attempt to override the restrictive court rulings. A crucial cornerstone 
of the ADAAA is a compromise concerning the scope of the “regarded as” prong 
of the disability definition. One aspect of the compromise is a dramatic expansion 
in the coverage of individuals adversely treated on the basis of an actual or 
perceived impairment. This expansion, however, is tempered by two 
accompanying limitations that exclude coverage of “transitory and minor” 
impairments and that eliminate any duty on the part of employers to provide 
reasonable accommodations to individuals who qualify as disabled solely under the 
“regarded as” prong. 
The ADAAA clearly is welcome legislation that expands the class of 
individuals protected against disability discrimination and deters workplace 
decision-making predicated on stereotypical preconceptions. The “regarded as” 
compromise, however, also comes with a series of lingering questions that have the 
potential to hinder the ultimate goals of the new legislation. These areas of 
uncertainty should be closely monitored in the years ahead to ensure that the courts 
do not again frustrate the ADA’s reinvigorated promise. 
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